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AN HONEST GHOST? . 
by 
A. J. AYER 
How radical is the central thesis of Ryle ·s The Concepl of :\lirid? 
Would it be true to say that it denied the very existence of minds. insofar 
a.s their existence is understood to imply that there are "inner" states 
or processes. or objects or events? There i s ,  indeed. a great deal of 
evidence in the book that this is what Ryle intends. • ' It is being main­
tained . .  , he says, " throughout this book that when we characterise people 
by n\ental predicates. we are not making untestable inferences to any 
ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are 
debarred from visiting: we are describing the ways in which these people 
conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour:· 1 Or agam: "The 
radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, 
because mental happenings are by definition conscious, or metaphys1· 
cally self-luminous , is that there are no such happenings: there are no 
occurrences taking place in a second-status world , since there is no such 
status and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of 
acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such a world.' .2 Or again : 
· 'It has been argued from a number of directions that when we speak of 
a person's mind, we are not speaking of a second theatre of special� 
status incidents, but of certain ways in which some of the incidents of 
his one lire are ordered. His life is not a double series of events taking 
place in different kinds of stuff: it is one concatenation of events, the 
differences between some and other classes 01· which largely consist n 
the applicability a inapplicability to them of logically different types of 
law-propositions and lawlike propositions . . • . So questions about the 
1-elations between a person and his mmd, like those about the relations 
between a person's body and his mind are improper questions. They are 
improper in much the same way as is the question 'What transactions go 
on between the House of Commons and the British Constitution?'' ·3 
It is in the same spirit that Ryle maintains that to explain an action 
i s  not to " infer to occult causes . . but to " subsume under hypothetical 
and semi-hypothetical propositions", that "the imputation of a motive 
for a. particular action is not a causal inference to an unwitnessed event 
but the subsumption of an episode proposition under a law-like propo­
sition'' ,4 that · 'consciousness and introspection cannot be what they are 
officially described as being, since their supposed objects are myths" 5: 
and that while ' 'the concept of picturing, visualising or 'seeing' is a 
proper and useful concept . . . its use does not entail the existence of 
• ••An Honest Ghost?'' by A.J. Ayer from the book RYLE: A COLLECTION OF CRIT ICAL 
ESSAYS, edited by George Pi tcher and Oscar Wood. Copyricht© 1970 by Doubleday & 
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pictures which we contemplate or the eKistence of a gallery in which 
such pictures are ephemerally suspended · · .  6 All these and many similar 
passages suggest very stront?:lY that the doctrine which Ryle is putting 
forward is a version of what is technically known as logical behaviourism. 
This is borne out by the fact that when he briefly discusses behaviour­
ism in the concluding section of his book. the only senous fault that he 
finds with psychologists of this school is their tendency to combine a 
meritorious denial of " ' inner-life' occurrences'' with what he regards as 
a mistaken addiction to Hobbist mechanism. 
Nevertheless a closer reading of the book may make us wonder 
whether Ryle ' s position is quite so straightforward. For the programme 
of logical behavourism to succeed. it has to be shown that all our talk 
about rnental states and processes can be reformulated in such a way as 
to eliminate any reference to an inner life. In the version of the pro­
gramme which we might attribute to Ryle. what would remain would be a 
set of dispositional statements about people's overt behaviour. "To talk 
of a person's mind . . .  is to t.alk of the person 's abilities. liabilities and 
inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing 
and underdoing of these things in the ordinary world." 7 The reasons for 
taking a view of this kind are commonly not that it is semantically plaus­
ible. but rather that it offers a way of escape from philosophical per­
plexities. It saves us from the difficulty, to which all dualistic theories 
are exposed, of explaining how mental and physical processes are related, 
or how one person can ever come to know what goes oo in the mind of 
another. This is. indeed, a great advantage , but it has to be earned. The 
elimination of all the ostensible references that we make to inner occur­
rences has to be carried through. 
Ryle does take it quite a long distance. He has arguments to show 
that displays of intelligence. whether in speech or action. do not entail 
private planning. that to exercise the will is not to engage in mental 
acts of volition, that motives are not "ghostly thrusts ' ' ,  that neither per· 
ceiving nor imagining entails the awareness of private objects . He does 
not, however, take it all the way. There are many passages in his book 
in which a reference to what would appear to be inner occurrences is 
still permitted to remain. Thus, in the course of making out his distinc­
tion between knowing how and knowing that, he remarks that much of our 
ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, 
usuall;-: accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual im· 
agery' •8 and he says of the exercises of knowing how that they · ' can be 
overt OT covert, deeds performed or deeds imagined, words spoken aloud 
or words heard in one's head, pictures painted on canvas or pictu1'es in 
the mind's eye" .9 He recognizes a special sense of the words 'mental' 
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and "mind', in which "a boy is said to be doing mental arithmetic" when 
oo says numerical symbols to himself "performing his calculations in 
silent soliloquy' · ,  or "a person is said to be reading the mind of another 
when he describes truly what the other is saying or picturing to himself 
in audirory or visual images · ·  . 1  O He does. indeed, go on to say that · "this 
special use of 'mental' and 'mind' in which they signify what is done 'in 
one's head' cannot be used as evidence for the ctogma of the ghost in the 
machine" .11 The secrecy which we secure for our thinking by conducting 
it in auditory word-images "is not the secrecy ascribed to the postulated 
episodes of the ghostly shadow-world. It is merely the convenient privacy 
which characterises the tunes that run in my head and the things that I 
see in my mind's eye'' . 12 But, whatever may be the differences between 
these sorts of secrecy, the existence of inner processes appears in any 
case to be conceded. 
In one significant passage. an admission of this kind immediately 
follows what might otherwise be taken to be its denial. Ryle has been 
arguing that the assumption. made by historians and scholars. that the 
qualities of people's minds are reflected in the things they say and do is 
only . . on the edge of the truth". The truth is that " the styles and proce· 
dures of people 's activities are the way their minds work"; they are not 
reflections of any "postulated secret processes " .  &> "Boswell described 
Johnson's mind when he described how he wrote , talked, ate, fidgeted 
and frowned". But it would seem not entirely, for Ryle immediately goes 
on: ''His description was, of course, incomplete, since there were notori­
ously some thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to himself and there 
must have been many dreams, day-dreams and silent babblings which 
only Johnson could have recorded and only a James Joyce would wish 
him to have recorded." l3 Whatever we may think of the implication that 
the stream of consciousness which Joyce attempted to reproduce is not 
worth transcribing, there is also the implication that it is there to be 
transcribed. 
A further admission 1s ihat of the existence of feelings, which Ryle 
equates witb "the sorts of things which people often describe as thrills ,  
twinges. pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, cbills, glows, loads, 
qualms. hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawing and shocks . '  .. i4 
As his choice of language indicates, he comes near to identifying feel-
ings with bodily sensations, though oo thinks that our descriptions of 
bodily sensations are not. He maintains that there are some feelings 
which we are ready to locate in particular parts of the body, as, for ex· 
ample, ' · the sinking feeling of despair in the pit of the stomach' ' and of 
others, like glows of pride, which are not specifically located, he says 
that they "seem to pervade the whole body in much the same way as do 
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glows of warmth" .15 A 11 this is no doubt intended to take a way from the 
'mentality• of feelings. but the fa ct remains that they are allowed to be 
felt . There 1s no suggestion thar talk of what a person feels , in this 
sense, can be translated into talk of the ways in which lte is disposed to 
behave . 
I t  may be unfair to add visual. auditory and other perceptual sen­
sations to the list of inner occurrences which Ryle apparently admits. 
since it would appear from the postscript to his chapter oo . . Sensation 
and Observation· '  that. he came to thmk that he had l>een mistaken in 
accepting the conventional view that perceiving entailed havmg sen­
sations of these sorts. In the same way, the references to visual and 
auditory images , which we have found him making in the earlier part of 
his book, ought perhaps to be discontinued on the ground that when at a 
later state he writes about Imagination. he argues that · · seeing things in 
one's mind's eye does not involve either ttle existence of things seen or 
the occurrence of acts of seeing them . · ·  16 Even so, we are still left with 
what Ryle describes as fan eying t.hat one sees or hears things, as well 
as with seeing, hearing and the other forms of perception themselves. 
Ryle does n<i explain what he takes fancying to be. apart from its not 
consisting in observing images. but if it is to do the work that he assigns 
to it, it  would seem that it must be a mental state or process of some 
sort, and one for which no analysis is given in behavioural tenns. Admit­
tedly, Ryle argues that the various forms of sense-perceptions are not 
mental states or processes, since they are not states or processes at all. 
His ground forthis is verbs like 'see' and 'hear' are what he calls achieve­
ment words: like the words 'win' or  'cure' or  'discover' they are not used 
to describe any activity but rather to state that something has been 
brought off. some task accomplished, some process carried to fulfilment. 
I am not entirely convinced that this is so. but even if it were so. it 
would make little difference to the present argument. For now we have to 
ask what are supposed to be the processes of which seeing and hearing 
and the other modes of perception are the fulfilment. In the case of sight 
and hearing, the words ' looking· and ' listening' can be called mto play: 
when it comes to the other senses, we shall probably be forced into 
circumlocution. unless words like 'touching' 'smelling' and 'tasting' are 
made to do double duty. But whatever words we use to stand ror th.em, 
these processes cannot on the face of it be taken to be purely physical. 
If it is to be related to seeing as running in a race is related to winning 
it. looking at an object must imply more than having one's eyes in such 
and such a physical relation to it. In old-fashioned terms. looking and 
listening must be conscious processes. At any rate Ryle gives us no 
reason to think otherwise. He does not take the desperate course, which 
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has been followed by some contemporary materialists, of trylnJ? to iden­
tify seeing and hearing with the acquisition of true beliefs. themselves 
reduced to behavioural dispositions. m consequence of the stimulation of 
the relevant sense-organs. However dissatisfied he may be with the stan­
dard philosophical accounts of sense-perception. te does not go to the 
length of dispensing altogether with any f onn 01· sentience . 
What then are we to make of these mental residues: the silent solilo­
quies. the itches. pangs, and gnawings, the dreams and day-dreams. the 
processes of fancying and those of which the various modes of perception 
are the achievements? Taken together, do they not furnish quite a robust 
inner life? How can Ryle admit them and yet not he haunted by "the ghost 
in the machine " ?  
Though he would not care to have it put in these terms. the answer 
may be that he believes his ghost to be an honest ghost. It would. there­
fore have to differ in some vital respect from the ghost which represents 
· 'the official doctrine"; and the way rn which he may thmk that it differs 
is that it does not command the stage of a private theatre. The inner 
occurrences which he is prepared to tolerate are not "p roprietary" in the 
way that the denizens cl the mind have commonly been thought to be. 
One difficulty at this point is that Ryle does not go mto the question 
of privacy in any detail. There are, however, indications that the type of 
privacy to which he objects is that which is ascribed to occurrences. or 
objects, or states , or processes, of which it  is held to be characteristic 
that the person to whom they are private observes them and that it is 
logically impossible that they should be observed by anyone else. He 
wishes to say that nothing is private in this sense. 
Does he succeed in showing that the inner life to which I have 
argued that ILe is still committed does not have this forbidden type of 
privacy? In the case of sensations and feelings, the argument on which 
he relies is that. so far as the power of observation goes, there is no 
asymmetry between oneself and other people. "It is true ." he says . 
• 'that the cobbler cannot witness the tweaks that 1 feel when the shoe 
pinches. But it is false that l witness them. The reason why my tweaks 
cannot be witnessed by him is not that some Iron Curtain prevents them 
from being wi..nessed by anyone save myself but that they are not the 
sort of things of which it makes sense to say that they are witnessed or 
unwitnessed at all, even by me. I feel or have the tweaks. but I do not 
discover or peer at them; they are not things that I find out about by 
watching them. listening to them, or savouring them. In the sense in 
which a person may be said to have had a ['Obin under observation, i t  
would be nonsense to say that he had had a twinge under observation. 
There may b& one or several witnesses of a road-accident: there cannot 
be several witnesses. or even one witness, of a qualm . ' ·  17 Of course 
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there is still the difference that 1 feel this particular twinge and the 
cobbler cannot, but Ryle maintains that this is no more than a trivial 
point of logic. Another person cannot feel my twinges for the same reason 
that he cannot smile my smile or run my races or die my death. It is just 
that we are concerned here with cognate accusatives. 
I am not convinced by this argument. The only reason which Ryle 
gives for saying that one cannot observe or witness one's sensations is 
that epithets which can be coupled with words like 'observing' and 'wit­
nessing' ,  when these are construed as task-words, cannot be applied to 
having sensations. We can re more er less successful at observing but 
not at having sensations; we can be said to observe. but not to have 
sensations. carefully or systematically; we can have motives for observ­
ing but not for having sensations: we can make mistakes of observation. 
but not of sensation, and so forth .18 But the most that this proves is that 
having sensations is not engaging in a task. It is not doing research, 
though research may lead to it. But, if we are to believe Ryle. exactly 
the same is true of seeing, hearing, touching and the other modes of 
perception. All his grammatical points apply just as well to them. Yet 
surely he would not wish to say that we do not observe or witness what 
we see. 
The truth is that verbs like 'observe' and 'witness' are commonly 
used both as task-words and as achievement-words. If R.yle is to capital­
ize m the fact that not everything that can be said about observing can 
also be said about having sensations, he will therefore have to maintain 
that it is only when construed as a task that observing is cognitive. But 
then he will be mistaken. The parallel case of seeing is a sufficient 
counter-example. 
There remains the point that sensations are cognate to feeling, 
whereas the objects which we perceive are not cognate to our perceiving 
them: from which it is inferred that the difference between perceiving and 
having sensations is not that one is acquainted with public objects in 
the one case and private objects in the other, but that while we can 
properly speak of there being objects of perception. to have a sensation 
is not to be acquainted with any object at all. My own view, about which 
I shall say a little more later on, is that this is a matter of policy. We 
are not bound to treat sensations, or feelings, or for that matter images, 
as private objects, but there is no compelling reason why we should not 
do so if we wish. But however this may be, even if we rule out private 
objects, it still will not follow , as Ryle assumes, that feeling is not a 
privileged source of information. The sense in which it is privileged can 
be illustrated by returning to Ryle's example of the ill-fitting shoe. No 
doubt the cobbler has ways of knowing that I feel the tweaks, although 
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the sceptical arguments which put this assumption 1n question still have 
to be met: but only I know that the tweaks are being felt, on the basis of 
feeling them. It is for this reason and not. as has sometimes been sug· 
gcsted. because it is improper to credit a person with knowledge of his 
own sensations, that the question how l know that I feel the tweaks ts 
not appropriate, though it will be appropriate to ask any other person how 
he knew that I felt them. This point is in fact conceded by Ryle. when he 
sanctions the dialogue ·'How do you know that the pain is in your leg and 
not in your shoulder?" "They are my leg and shoulder. aren't they?" 19 
This need not imply that I cannot be mistaken with regard to such things 
as the location of my pains. but surely it is a claim, and a valid claim, 
to the possession of what Ryle calls ' 'privileged access". 
Much the same considerations apply to the cases of imagining and 
perceiving. It is not enough fm Ryle's purposes to do away with mental 
images and sense·data. The fact that I am imagining or ostensibly per­
ceiving whatever it may be will still be known to me in a way that it 
cannot be known to other people. On the assumption that the objects of 
sense-perception .are public, if they exist at all. I am not in a privileged 
position with respect to the identification of what I perceive: there are, 
however, the same reasons as in the case of my sensations ror holding 
that I am in a privileged position with respect to knowing what i t  seems 
to me that I perceive. and my use a moment ago of the artificial expres­
sion "ostensibly perceiving'' was intended to make this qualification. 
In the case of imagining, the parallel with having sensations is obv�ous 
and Ryle indeed concedes it when, in a passage which I have already 
quoted, he speaks of Dr. Johnson's day-dreams as something that only 
Johnson could record. 
A point to which Ryle attaches some importance is that such records 
are restrospective. He rejects the theory according to which "mental 
processes are conscious, not in the sense that we do or could report on 
them post mortem, but in the sense that their intimations of their own 
occurrences are properties of those occurrences and so are not posterior 
to them'' .20 He denies not only that mental processes, if they existed, 
could be self-luminous but also that there could be such a thing as intro­
spection, if  this is taken to be a species of perception which has internal 
rather than external objects. H i s  main argument against the view that 
mental processes are self-luminous is that the consciousness of a mental 
process cannot be identical with the mental process itself. For example, 
if the process is one of carrying out an inference, then ''my conscious­
ness is of a process of inferring, but my inferring is, perhaps . of geomet­
rical conclusion from geometrical premiss€s. The verbal expression of 
of my inference might be, 'because this is an equilateral triangle. there-
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fore each angle is 60 degrees ' ,  but the verbal expression of what I am 
conscious of might be ·Here I am deducing such and such from so �nd 
so' ' ' .  21 In the same way, my consciousnes s of my consciousness of my 
process cf inferring must be differentiated from my consciousness of the 
process. But then. if we take every mental process to be self-luminous 
we are led mto an infinite regress. One might have expected Ryle to 
argue that a similar regress would arise on the assumption that every 
mental process was introspective, but he contents himself instead with 
the empirical arguments that there must be ·'some limit to the number of 
possible synchronous acts of attention · ·22 and that. as Hume pointed out. 
there are some states of mind which put us into too much agitation for it 
to be possible for us to scrutinize them coolly, These last objections do 
not apply to retrospection which. in Ryle's opinion, achieves all the 
legitimate ends for which introspection was thought to be required. or 
course, retrospection is not infallible, as introspection has sometimes 
been taken to be: but the quest for infallibility is anyhow mistaken. 
These arguments are not very easy to evaluate . What they seem to 
me to prove is first that the metaphor of the inner searchlight is not 
felicitous and. secondly, that it cannot rightly be assumed that we al­
ways in fa.ct know what our mental processes are. On the other hand. 
they do not prove that there are any mental processes which are such 
that we are not in a position to know that they are occurring: and, what 
is more important, they do not prove that we do not obtain this knowl­
edge, when we have it, in a way that is not available to anybody else. 
Neither does it seem to me to matter very much whether the knowledge is 
acquired concurrently with the mental process to which it relates or a 
little subsequently to it. I should have thought that in some cases it was 
concurrent and in others. not. The important point, in either case, is that. 
although the knowledge can be shared with others, we alone obtain it on 
the basis -Of actually undergoing, or havin g  just previously undergone, 
the experience in question. 
Ryle admits it to be true and important that · "the objects of my retro­
spection are items in 1ny autobiography' ·23 , but will not allow that there 
is anything " intrinsically ghostly" about them. "In the same way that I 
can catch myself day-dreaming, I can catch myself scratching: in the 
same way that I can catch myself engaged in a piece of silent soliloQuy ,  
I can catch myself saying something aloud ··  .24 But this is to miss the 
point. The fact that I can "catch myself" in the performance of physical 
as well as mental activities does not entail that when the object of retro­
spection is mental, my access to it is not privileged. A.11 that it entails 
is that this does not follow merely from the fact that it is retrospective. 
In general, Ryle's strategy is not so much to deny the existence of 
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''privileged access'· as to represent it as marking a difference of degree 
and not a difference of kind. "The superiority of the speaker's knowledge 
of what he i s  doing over that of the listener does not indicate that he has 
Privileged Access to facts of a type inevitably inaccessible to the listen­
er, but only that oo is in a very good position to know what the listener 
is often in a very poor position to know.' •25 So, when Ryle speaks of 
thinking as silent soliloquy, the suggestion is that what makes it im­
possible for others to eavesdrop oo my unspoken thoughts is that they 
are pitched in too low a key: thinking without saying what we think is 
like whispering very softly; so softly that no one e)se can overhear yoo. 
And then one wonders whether there could not be some device by which 
these whisperings could be magnified. For example, if, like the behavior­
ist Dr. Watson, one wete to identify thoughts with movements of the 
larynx, one could look forward to the time when all such movements 
would be capable of being recorded and the thoughts which they repre­
sented read off from them. But this is not Ryle's position. He nowhere 
suggests that his silent soliloquies are to be equated with physiological 
states or processes: nor does he make any attempt to translate them into 
behavioural dispositions. But if they are not transmutable into physical 
terms, it may not be a contingent fact that only their author overhears 
them. It is, indeed, contingent that I keep certain thoughts to myself. in­
stead of expressing them in writing or in speech: but given that I do keep 
them to myself. it is arguable that the possibility of any other person's 
listening in to them is logically excluded, since there is nothing that 
would count as his listening in. 
To this it may be objected that while such an argument may conform 
to our current usage , it still takes too narrow a view of the empirical 
possihilities. Whatever the technical difficulties, it is surely not incon­
ceivable that a portion of rey brain should be transplanted into another 
person's body: and if that were to happen, he might come to remember my 
thoughts in just the way that I myself remember them. Indeed, ere might 
go further: it is imaginable that my brain should be so connected to an­
other person's that he currently caught on to my mental processes in just 
the way that I do. Admittedly, such examples put a strain on our concept 
of personal identity. There could be circumstances in which we should 
find it more natural to say that I had been translated into another booy 
than that another person shared my memories. let alone my present con­
sciousness. On the other hand , there could be circumstances in which 
we should find it more natural to abandon the rule that the experiences 
which one can remember, or even those of which one can be currently 
aware, are necessarily one's own. 
I think that these possibilities have to be admitted; .and if we admit 
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them we may have to allow that it is or1ly a contingent fact that my ex­
periences are accessible to me in a way that they ar e  not accessible to 
anyone else. Nevertheless. there will still be a distinction between 
knowing about an experience on the basis of having it, or recollecting it, 
and knowing about it only on the basis of observing the bodily states or 
behaviour or the person whose experience it is; and there will still be 
grounds for holding that a claim to knowledge which is based on having 
the experience in question is authoritative in a way th.at a claim which is 
based only on observation cannot be. 26 Moreover, some at least of the 
sceptical arguments concerning the possibility of our having any know­
ledge of this kind on the basis of "external" observation will still need 
to be met. I do not say that there is no way of meeting them, although I 
do not think that any satisfactory way has yet been found . This is a prob­
lem that is almost ignored by Ryle. no doubt because he sees himself as 
having undercut it. He would, indeed, be justified in this assumption if 
he had made good the thesis of logical behaviourism. I have, however, 
tried to show not only that he has not made it good, but that it is doubtful 
even if he holds it in any rigorous form. 
In fact, I think that there are three general theses in The Concept of 
Mind which Ryle does not explicitly distlnguish. The thesis which I have 
just suggested that he probably does not hold, though his programmatic 
statements often imply that he does, is that all our talk about the mind 
is translated into talk about behaviour. If he does hold this thesis, the 
least that one can say is that he has left himself a great deal of work to 
do: we have seen that he makes a number of admissions, which appear to 
be inconsistent with it. There is, however, a weaker thesis which is con­
sistently held throughout the book. This is the thesis that, whether or 
not the programme of logical behaviourism can be carried through in its 
entirety, it does give a correct account of a great deal of what is ordinar­
ily classified as talk about the mind. In a great many instances in which 
a person is said to satisfy a " mental" predicate , what is being said of 
him is not only, and perhaps not at all, that he is undergoing some inner 
process. but rather that he is exhibiting or disposed to exhibit a certain 
pattern of behaviour. This can apply to the ascription of intelligence, of 
motives and purposes ,  of voluntary actions, of emotions and moods. and 
of thoughts when they are overtly expressed. 
Thi;3 the�i� is weaker than the other, in that it. does not do '1way 
with inner processes altogether. What it does is to minimize their role. 
When someone acts intelligently, his movements may be preceded or 
accompanied by some inner planning. but th�y need not be; the silent 
thought is not necessary for the performance to be intelligent. Similarly, 
when I utter a meaningful sentence, it is possible, but not necessary, 
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rhat I have already nm through the sentence "in my hea d " :  even if no 
such inner process has taken place, the utterance will still t:e the ex­
pression of my thought. ln the case of the will.  Ryle takes the stronger 
line cf denyin� that there are any inner acts to which ' · willing" could 
be raken 10 ref er; but his main pomr.. here again. 1s that even if such 
acts of volition were to occur, their occurrence could not be uecessary 
10 make an acuon voluntary: for one rhing. the assumption that they were 
necessary would lead to an infinite regress, since it would make sense 
to ask whether rhese acts were vohmta1y themselves. When it comes to 
motives Ryte iS on less sure growtd . since his theory that ' ' the imputa­
tion of a motive . .  is the subsumpt.ion of an episode proposition under 
a law-like proposition' •27 applies only to standing motives. like vanity 
or ambition, to which, mdeed. he confines his examples: it does not 
apply to the occurrent motives that one may have for dicing particular 
actions, like leaving early to catch a train. He could, however, have 
argued that even when one is acting from an occurrent motive, one need 
not , though one may, avow it oneself: and even if one does avow it, the 
avowal may take the form of an overt utterance. Finally, the case of 
emotions lS different from the other$. since here the occunence of some 
umer feelm�. or at leas\ a bodily sensation, does seem to be essentia l :  
even so it can be argued that the feeling plays a relatively minor part m 
the complex state of affairs in which the emotion consists· the attendant 
behaviour and, still more. the behavioural dispositions aa-e what really 
count. 
I am doubtful whether this is true of all emotions - it applies, for 
example, to anger better than it does to sorrow - but even if the em­
phasis ls wrong in this case. the general thesis seems to me true and 
import ant. There has been a tendency among philosophers to assume that 
everythrng that commonly passes for the work of mind consists in, or at 
least essenually involves. some inner process, and it is useful to have 
this tendency corrected. It needed to be shown that such thmgs as in­
tending. WJ lling, understanding, desiring. exercising intelligence, even 
thinking, may. in concrete instances. consist m nothmg more than the 
fact that the petson of whom they are pred1cat.ed is hetia ving or is dis­
posed to behave in such and such a fashion. Nev�rtheless the scope of 
the thesis should not he over-estimated. In the areas which it covers. it 
estahlishes for the most part only that thl! occuirence or inner processes 
is net essential for the application of a given mental predicate, not. that 
they do uot occur at alt and there are important areas or mental activity 
which it does not cover. As a result, no doubt, of his flirtation with the 
more radical thesis of logical behaviourism. Ryle gJves lhe impression 
of thinking that all the mental operations that really matter are over� 
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operations. For any ordinary purpose. the residue is nei.:li�ible. Only a 
James .Joyce would bother with it.  But. as we have seen. the residue is 
far from negligible. It includes a considerable part of the exercise of 
memory and of the imagination, and it includes every form of sentience. 
Until it is shown that perceiving can be analysed in behavioural terms. 
the erosion of the inner life. to which this second thesis tends. will re· 
main seriously incomplete. As I said before. attempts have been made to 
bring perception into line. but I do not myself thmk that they have been. 
or are likely to be, successful. 
The third thesis which J find in '/'he• ('unr·cpt oi :\lin<L is weaker still. 
It is that our ordinary talk about the mind is open to what Quine calls 
regimentation.28 We do not have to conceive of minds as substaraces. or 
indeed as entities of any kind. We do not have to admit thou�hts. or feel­
ings, or sensation, or mental images, or sense-data us ob.)ects. The only 
subjects to which mental predicates need to be ascribed are persons, and 
any particular mental object, like an image or a sense-datum, can be 
transfo1·med into a way in which a person is affected. that is, into a state 
or process which is adjectival to him. So thought will be replaced by 
thinking, images by imagining, feelin�s by feeling, and sense-data by 
perceiving or seeming to perceive. 
But what of the accusatives of these words? Ryle does not enter 
into the question in any detail but I think that his policy, except in the 
case of perception and feeling, would be to make them propositional. Not 
all I hi11king is straightforwardly . .  thinking that". but with a little ad­
justment, such activities as wondering, musing, speculating. doubting, 
pondering, even dreaming, can be rep1esented as being directed on to 
propositions. Without too much strain. the same can be made true of opta­
tive activities like wishmg, hoping, fearing, desiring. seekin�. and re­
gretting: their object will be the proposition that such and such a state 
of affairs obtains or does not obtain. In spite of Ryle's efforts, the case 
of imag1mng remains more difficult. It is not easy to see how having an 
after-image can be represented as fancying that something is the case. 
To this extent, imagining comes cl.)ser to perceiving. in cases where 
the perception is delusive. ln the casGs whet·e iC is veridical. the1·e is no 
problem .  The objects which are p�rcuved ;ire physical entities, in the 
broad sense in winch anything counts as physical ff it is a real consti­
tuent of the external world. These objects will serve also in the delusive 
cases in which the infidelity of lhe perception consists in its making them 
appear other than they are. But what is to be said when che delus:ive per­
ception is a total hallucination? Tins does not force the admission of 
sense-data. We can talk or our seeminJ!: to perceive. or thmkmg thar we 
perceive, physical entities which do not in fact ex.isl. But what sort of 
objects are these? 
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The cas� of feehn�. e"cepr m the sense. winch 1s nor here 111 ques­
tion. in wtuch · reehng· is roul!hlY eQu1valent to · rmtehmi?·. ts d\fft>rent 
in that it is not possible to divide irs ohJects mt0 those winch do and 
those which do not exist. The panj?: which is felt m a phanrona Hmb has 
the same status.  a.s an entity, � the pan,.: which IS felt rn au:v actual J);lrt 
or the body. If this status is nor to be that of an obrN·r. lt seems that 
expressions which refer to feelm�s will have to be trear�d as co�nate 
accusarives of the verbs wtuch �overn them. Whal this amou11ts to ts that 
one refuses to license the existential mference from a pro�osition of the 
form "A has the feeling { . . to a proposmon of the lorm "There lS a f Pel­
irig (, which A has". I do nm know that any �ood reason can be �lvcn ror 
this prohibition. except that on grounds of economy a a taste for neat· 
ness. one decides to have only physical entmes In one's ornolo�y. bur 
neither do I see any strong objection to tt. The ohJec11011 1 ha1 one mi�ht 
raise would be epistemological. It might be ar1:11ed that smce •· feelings 
are rust · · .  m the sense rhal they are epistemolo�tcallv pnor to the per­
sons to whom they are attributed. they have the better mle to existence. 
t accept its conclusion. but I now th10k. for reasons which I have de­
veloped elsewhere. 29 that epistemological and onrological priority do not 
have to go together. 
The same technique can be applied to images and to the objects or 
hallucinatory perceprion. One can simply rerusie to license the mference 
from " A  is having an ima(?e" to . . There is an 1ma�e which A is havmg'' 
and from "A perceives a non-ex.istent physical entity" 10 .. There is a 
non-existent physical entity which A perceive s " .  But here there is more 
reason for disquiet. Even as the designates or co�nate accusatives. non­
existent physical entities have a disreputable an. A better course, ll 
seems to me. would be to admtt sense-data and treat them a.s COitnate to 
perceptual acts. But if we admit sense-data at all. how can we resist 
admitting them m other cases or perception . mcludm� those rhat are 
veridical? The answer is that there 1s no call to resist .  That a perceptual 
a.ct always has a cognate object does not preclude as also hav111� a real 
one·. and the real object. when it exists, will be a physical entity. 
Since this technique could also be applied to thOUithts and to the 
possibly non·existent oh1ects of optative acts. one may wonder what 1s 
gamed by brmging in propositional accusatives. A mouve for doing so 
might be that p • ..>positions are at least not mental ob,ects. but ttns ls not 
enough to make them respectable. We can mdeed refuse to treat them as 
entities, but then it is not clear why they are to be preferre d to the non­
enmtes which they replace. There would. howe ver. be a re.ason for pre­
ferring them if they were thought to be ehmmable. The m troducuon or 
propositional accusatives would then be a srage in 1 he process of getting 
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l'id of int{'ntionality. Propositions would be replaced in their turn by 
sent�nces. and \\n ac<-<.>11nt of the i.1se and m1dersta nding of sentences 
would be given in behavioural t.erms. I am attracted by this prngramme, 
and lhink that it oughr to be successful, but it meets with difficulties 
which have not. in my view. as yet been overcome. 30 
Failing the completion of a programme of this sort, the regimentation 
of mental discourse does not amount to very much. It comes down t o  little 
more than a decision not to say that such things as feelings. images and 
sense-data exist, or at any rate uot to allow them the status of entities. 
No doubt Ryle intended more than this. When he denied the existence of 
images or sense-data ,  he wanted to show not only that we were not. bound 
to include such things in our ontology, but that we were not entitled to. 
This could be achieved either by deduction from some ontological theory, 
which would itself then need to be justified, or by showing that the con­
cept of the type of entity in question was such that nothing answered to 
it. Though Ryle has a physicalist ontology 1Il the background, ancl some­
times proceeds as though he had estaLlished it, the course which he 
mainly tollows is the second. The argument on which he relies is that 
neither imagining nor sensing, as this term is used by sense-datum theo­
rists. is a sort of observing: in rhe case of sensing, this :is backed by 
the argu ment that if perceiv!ng entailed sensing, and sensing were itself 
a sort of perceiving. an admission of sense-data would involve a vicious 
infinite regress. If · observing' is taken here as a task word, the main 
argumen t  holds: but then, as we have seen, it proves nothing t o  tlie pur­
pose. If,  in accordance with the infinite regress argument, observing is 
equated with perceiving, the grounds for saying that imagining and sen­
sing are not sorts of observing would be either that they are rwt the 
completion of activities like looking and listening, or that they do not 
have physical entities as their objects. But even on the dubious assump­
tion that perceiving is always the completion of an activity, there is no 
good reason why this should be made a necessary condition for any con­
scious state t.o have an existent object: and the point that the objects of 
imagining and sensing would not be physical entities plainly begs the 
question. Neither is there anything in the infinite regress argument. The 
ground for bringing in sense-data is that our ordinary judgements of per­
ception commit us to more than is contained in the experiences on which 
they are based.31 The invocation of sense-data is intended t.o provide us 
wlth a way of describing the contents of the experiences, without in· 
curring any further commitments. It is not universally agreed that it suc­
ceeds in this . but if. as I believe, it does succeed. it cle<Lrly does not 
entail that we have to go on reducing our commitments ml i11f initum. 
There is no foothold here for the regress to begin. 
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I conclude that Ryle has not shown that we are not entitled to admit 
even �ense-data as entities, but at most that we are not bound to do so. 
The decision not to adm1t them. together with other · · private'· entities 
like images and feelings. does not require a denial of their legitimacy. I 
thrnk it can tie shown that even if one starts . e?istemologically. from the 
neutral monist basis of sense-data. images and feelings. it is still pos­
sible and mdeed desirable to have a physicalist ontology .32 This is, 
indeed, a m\1ch weaker result than one would get if one were able to 
prove that all mental states or processes were logically or even factually 
identical with physical ones. but here I doubt if anything better is ob­
tainable. If there are any hopes for physicalism. they must lie in the 
attempt to establish factual identity. The belief in a logical identity is 
simpler and bolder, but l think it has become clear that it is false. 
This is not necessarily a reproach to Ryle since we have seen that 
he does not attempt to carry the logical thesis all the way. In fact, I 
believe that te takes it about as far as it can legitimately go. or the 
three theses that I have extracted from The Concept of Mind, it is only 
the second that yields a substantial result. the third, in the form in which 
it 1s true, being too weak to be of very much i nterest. In short, what Ryle 
has succeeded in doing is to reduce the empire of the mind over a con­
siderable area. This is an important achievement. and one that is bril­
liantly effected. but it does not fulfil Ryle 's professed intention of 
entirely exorcizing the ghost in the machine. The movements of the ghost 
have been curtailed but it still walks, and some of us are still haunted 
by it. 
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